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In 2014, the world was horrified by the Ebola pandemic, with the World 
Health Organization (WHO) expected to control the pandemic as a unique 
inter-governmental health organisation. However, the WHO could not fully 
respond in a public health emergency and has received worldwide criticism 
based on their ‘inability’. One critic even said, the ‘WHO ought to be defunded 
to discipline its ineptitude and frivolity’.1 With the changing environment 
surrounding global health, the WHO’s raison d’être in today’s global health 
governance (GHG) has long been discussed. The Ebola crisis was a fatal blow 
to the WHO. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to why the WHO 
was established and who established it. 
In the academic field, much research has been conducted on the WHO 
from various perspectives, including its involvement in post-war international 
politics,2 a continuity from the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO), 
and its impact on today’s GHG.3 Regarding the last point, Amrith depicts how 
different levels of health systems—national, local, and international—interacted 
with each other and were synthesised through the WHO’s activities.4 Fidler 
argues for the development of the International Health Regulations (IHRs), and 
for the WHO’s potential in supervising it.5 However, little research has been 
conducted to explain how and for what purpose the WHO, as a new form of 
world health, came into being.
The WHO was established as one of United Nations’ (UN) specialised 
agencies just after the Second World War. In this regard, Allied countries, a 
term commonly used during the war to describe the Western powers fighting 
alongside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),6 were inevitably 
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involved in its creation. It was in 1943 when preparations for the post-
war international health organisation accelerated in earnest. The years from 
1943 through 1946, when the WHO Constitution was settled, saw various 
negotiations and compromises among the actors involved. Because of this 
bargaining, the WHO was created as a new form of international health 
organisation, while maintaining the old aspects of international health, which 
reflected traditional world politics. By examining the WHO creation process, 
especially focusing on the power politics behind it and the pre-war influence on 
it, this paper attempts to examine how and for what purpose the WHO, as a new 
form of international health organisation, was created, and to find clues on how 
the story of its creation influenced the WHO’s functioning.  
The paper is composed of seven sections. The first section reviews the 
LNHO, as the predecessor of the WHO, and its impact on the WHO. The 
LNHO invented a new form of international health organisation, about which 
this paper focuses on two features: its involvement in social-medical activities 
and its adoption of the functional approach, which were closely interrelated. 
Those two points also featured the League’s other technical work, and had a 
great impact on the Allies’ post-war planning. The following section examines 
how the LNHO’s work and its experts’ plans affected the Allies’ post-war 
planning. The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture (UNCFA), 
which was convened in 1943 as the first United Nations Conference, concretely 
demonstrated the impact of the League’s features (the third section). Since 
then, mainly the United States (US) took the initiative in creating a new 
international health organisation, while the LNHO’s experts played a crucial 
role in urging the major Allies to collaborate (the fourth section). The major 
Allies almost agreed to establish an international health organisation as soon 
as possible with close ties to the United Nations, but held negotiations in order 
to reach compromise over their own national interests (the fifth section). At 
the International Health Conference that was held in 1946 to draft the WHO 
Constitution, each representative attempted to build into the WHO’s structure 
its own national interest such as its colonial interests or interest in regional 
order, while sharing the need for a new type of international health organisation 
(the sixth and seventh sections).
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The WHO creation process was, in part, quite similar to that of the LNHO, 
as a result of politics among powers. On the other hand, two new stories 
accompanied this old repeated story: the first was that the major Allies’ earnest 
engagement in the creation of the WHO was motivated not only by their 
national interests, but also by their strong expectation for the role this new 
health organisation would play in the global security system. The second new 
aspect was that a new transnational network that included non-Western and 
non-state actors showed strong resistance towards the big powers’ arbitrary 
movements and succeeded in establishing a new system. The WHO was thus 
established, mixing hope for a better world with the reality of power politics. 
This historical background continues to influence the WHO’s activities and 
governance even today. 
The LNHO and its two features
The establishment of the LNHO in 1921 was epoch-making in international 
health co-operation for various reasons: first, the LNHO established a global 
co-operative framework on health in which various actors, including experts, 
related governments, related organisations and charitable foundations, 
co-operated to promote world health. In this paper, ‘expert’ refers to an 
international high-ranking bureaucrat with a specialty such as public health, 
economics or finance; second, the LNHO carried out health work not only in 
Europe but also in non-European regions.7 The LNHO expanded its operations 
in Asia, where the existing inter-colonial practice and collaboration system 
has been incorporated into an international health activity initiated by the 
LNHO.8 As many scholars have pointed out, the old form of international 
health survived during the interwar period: the expected merger of the Office 
International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP), established in 1907, with the LNHO, 
which was meant to avoid overlap and the potential for friction, never took 
place; the epidemic control system was built along with regional order,9 which 
made it more difficult to establish a converged global system for epidemic 
control.
In such an age, the LNHO certainly introduced new aspects to world health 
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in spite of retaining those old aspects. Among these, this paper focuses on 
two features. The first was that the LNHO engaged in not only controlling 
epidemics, but also social-medical activities, such as improving nutrition and 
housing. Social medicine is an approach which focuses on the environment 
surrounding human’s daily life, by seeking to understand the interconnection 
among health, disease and social conditions.10 During the First World War, the 
idea of health promotion and socialised primary health care gained in popularity 
especially in the US, and was realised in the form of public education and health 
reform. Health reformers, including the US Public Health Service (USPHS) 
and charitable foundations, were inspired to expand their local activities in the 
global arena in order to transform international public health.11 Among all, the 
International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation played a significant 
role in mobilising international support for public health programs,12 which was 
in part motivated by technical ambition towards global health governance.13
The Foundation’s idea influenced the LNHO’s platform as the LNHO was 
largely funded by the Foundation at that time. The LNHO experts, including 
Andrija Štampar from Yugoslavia, René Sand from Belgium and Ludwik 
Rajchman from Poland, were inspired by this movement, which prompted the 
LNHO to adopt a comprehensive approach toward human health as early as the 
mid-1920s.14 For example, the LNHO initiated pioneering work in China, where 
they argued for a focus on destroying the threat of epidemic disease at its source 
and developed strong national health services.15 The economic crisis of the early 
1930s accelerated a social medical approach, with the health effects of social 
deprivation in both urban and rural contexts displaying detrimental results,16 
which resulted in a comprehensive approach towards nutritional problems with 
experts from different fields such as food, agriculture, health, and economics.17 
The second new aspect that the LNHO featured was the functional approach. 
British scholar David Mitrany proposed the functional approach, which was 
to be reflected in the UN system through the creation of a series of functional 
agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the WHO. 
The functional approach was, according to Mitrany, an approach to peace 
through international functional cooperation on common needs such as control 
of epidemics or food.18 Mitrany never worked at the League of Nations, but 
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his idea, which he first proposed in The Progress of International Government 
(1933),19 influenced the League’s activities and even post-war planning 
because of his service as an advisor to the League’s Economic and Financial 
Organisation (EFO), and his personal connection with key League persons, 
including Alexander Loveday, the director of the EFO.20
Stanley Bruce’s well-known report of 1939 (the ‘Bruce Report’) proposed 
establishing the Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions and 
an active role for non-League-affiliated countries, especially the US,21 and 
aimed at reconstructing the League by making it the centre of global functional 
cooperation.22 Mitrany himself evaluated the Bruce Report as an example of 
the functional approach.23 In the wake of this report, the LNHO’s health and 
social activities were reorganised in an attempt to assume an expansive mission 
informed by the broader agendas of social medicine,24 which implied that the 
functional approach and social-medical approach were inseparable from each 
other.
The LNHO experts shared this recognition with the drafters of the Bruce 
Report, and attempted to preserve the two features of the post-war health 
organisation. Raymond Gautier, the last acting director of the LNHO, wrote 
in 1943, ‘health is more than the absence of illness: the word “health” 
implies something positive, namely, physical, mental and moral fitness’. He 
emphasised that the post-war international health organisation should strive 
for the attainment of ‘positive health’, on the basis of the LNHO’s activities, 
with ‘greater power’ and ‘heavier responsibilities’.25 ‘Positive health’, as a 
comprehensive approach towards human health originated from the LNHO’s 
experience, was an attempt to implement the functional approach by engaging 
in social-medical activities, and was to be spelled out in the preface of the 
WHO Constitution. The LNHO’s two features thus had a great impact on post-
war planning, and its experts played an essential role in this effort. 
The LNHO experts’ post-war planning
In 1940, the practical activities of the LNHO were on the shoulders of Gautier 
and Yves Biraud, the Director of Epidemical Intelligence Services of the LNHO, 
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since many of LNHO experts returned to their home countries for wartime 
duties. Gautier and Biraud devoted themselves to continuing their work as 
much as possible, even though the size of its activities was largely diminished.26 
In the spring of 1942, the Post-war Requirement Bureau, the predecessor of the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), asked the 
LNHO to collaborate on nutrition research and epidemic intelligence services 
in wartime Europe. In October of that year, Gautier travelled to London at the 
Bureau’s request to participate in the Bureau’s project on malaria, diphtheria, 
and cholera, with the goal of establishing an agreement among Allied countries 
on the estimated amount of medical supplies. In April 1943, Gautier went to 
Washington at the US State Department’s request to be in charge of a counsellor 
on the Allies’ health work for a year.
However, what weighed on his mind most during his stay in London and 
Washington was the future of health organisations, so he and Biraud, who had 
remained in Geneva, kept in touch with each other, consulting and planning 
a post-war international health organisation.27 In this regard, Gautier and 
Biraud drafted a plan in 1943 (1943 plan) for a post-war international health 
organisation.28 The following four points were retained and reflected in the 
structure of the WHO, while this plan was revised a few times according to the 
development of the UN-creation plan.
The first key point was to establish a post-war international health 
organisation on the basis of the LNHO’s activities and experience, especially 
those in epidemic intelligence services. The LNHO established the Epidemic 
Intelligence Services in Geneva, and in Asia, the organisation played a crucial 
role in combining a regional sanitary system with an international system 
through the Far Eastern Bureau.29 According to the drafters, there was a large 
volume of statistics on infectious diseases, compiled over the course of twenty 
years, at the LNHO’s Epidemical Intelligence Services that could be utilised 
in post-war health work. On the other hand, the drafters also suggested some 
reform for improving the efficiency of this work and for generalising the 
reporting of infectious diseases worldwide by establishing at least one epidemic 
intelligence branch on each continent.30 At that time, some regions, including 
Africa, did not fully enjoy the epidemic intelligence service.31
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The second key point of the 1943 plan was the uniqueness of the post-war 
international health organisation, which the drafters actually emphasised in all 
four points.32 They persisted in emphasising the uniqueness of the organisation 
so eagerly because of their bitter experience with the OIHP. The General 
Advisory Health Council was established for a smooth communication and 
collaboration between the LNHO and the OIHP, but the rivalry and duplication 
of work persisted.33 Two different organisations without effective co-ordination 
stood apart from the others, which hindered the smooth functioning of the 
international health work.34 Based on this experience, the drafters insisted that 
the post-war health organisation be unique and centralised.
The third key point was to secure the autonomy of the international 
health organisation by assigning greater role to experts. The central agency, 
they proposed, should be composed of a consulting assembly, an executive 
committee and a secretariat; each organ should be composed of both experts 
and government delegates. Gautier and Biraud stressed the importance of 
having government delegates in an executive committee in order to make 
resolutions effective. They simultaneously proposed authorising the executive 
committee to independently organise the technical committee in order to 
counter the excessive influence of governmental officials, who would manage 
the executive committee for their own diplomatic ambitions.35 
The fourth key point of the 1943 plan was to practice the functional 
approach by engaging in wide range of health activities. Gautier, who regarded 
international health policies as a form of ‘collective security’, proposed that 
the post-war international health organisation should convene an international 
conference on a specific theme, such as nutrition, housing or health insurance, 
where government delegates with specialised counsellors could attend 
discussions which would promote close relations among countries and result in 
international co-operation.36 
In this way, Gautier and Biraud strived to establish a post-war international 
health organisation which reflected the LNHO’s two features and was based 
on the LNHO’s experience. They were partly motivated by their sense of crisis 
with the rise of other health agencies, in addition to the LNHO’s unpopularity. 
Around that time, the LNHO’s survival in the post-war period seemed quite 
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difficult, and establishing a new health organisation with the LNHO features 
seemed the only possible way for the LNHO to succeed in its work and ideas 
in the post-war period. For example, when the British Ministry of Health and 
the USPHS discussed a post-war international health organisation in September 
1943, both generally recognised that ‘there is in fact no acceptable international 
health organisation existing at the present time’,37 which indicated that the 
US and British officials did not suppose the LNHO would survive in the post-
war period. Rather, the UNRRA’s Health Division seemed more likely to take 
initiative in the post-war international health. With the inception of the UNRRA 
in late 1943, the collaboration between the LNHO and UNRRA on epidemic 
intelligence service developed, which resulted in, at the UNRRA’s request, the 
creation of the Health Research Unit (HRU), an LNHO branch, in Washington 
in May 1944.38
The UNRRA, however, took its own health initiative rather than taking care 
of the cooperative relationship with the LNHO, which irritated the LNHO.39 
In 1944, along with the revision of the International Sanitary Convention, the 
UNRRA was responsible for supervising the conventions, and established its 
own Epidemiological Intelligence Service in July. The UNRRA then proposed 
to the LNHO to incorporate the HRU into this new division.40 In fact, the 
UNRRA officials thought that the UNRRA should not rely on the LNHO, but 
have its own epidemic intelligence service.41 Biraud was very upset since this 
movement meant the duplication of the LNHO’s work, and it seemed as if the 
LNHO’s collaboration with the UNRRA was almost of no use.42 The HRU 
eventually transferred to the UNRRA as of 1 January 1945.43 The OIHP also 
irritated the LNHO as it made an unexpected comeback with its claim to be in 
charge of the International Sanitary Convention after its liberation in August 
1944.44 The 1943 plan was thus drafted as a last resort for the LNHO to succeed 
in its work and utilise its experience in the post-war period, and fortunately, the 
plan was finally realised under the auspices of the Allies’ post-war planners. 
The Creation of the UN System
At the start of the war, Loveday—along with the EFO, which relocated to 
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the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University—moved to the US, 
where he kept in close touch with key officials of the US State Department 
including Leo Pasvolsky. Pasvolsky, an economist who was the US Delegate 
at the League’s economic and financial conferences in the 1930s,45 reflected 
the functional approach in his post-war planning. Around 1943, the State 
Department’s special sub-committee on post-war planning, which Pasvolsky 
led, recognised that health and social welfare work was one of the League’s 
achievements, and proposed to promote these activities in the post-war period. 
This proposal was later used as the basis for the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal in 
1944.46
The idea took shape in the form of a permanent food organisation when the 
UNCFA was convened in May 1943.47 The League’s experts played a crucial 
role in convening this conference: Loveday and Frank McDougall, who was 
the economic advisor to Bruce, persuaded Eleanor Roosevelt to recommend to 
her husband to convene the conference on food. Loveday also recommended 
Pasvolsky and other US officials to establish a permanent international food 
organisation.48 The UNCFA had two aims: to strengthen wartime unity among 
Allied countries,49 and to establish a cooperative relationship among them, 
which would pave the way for further collaboration on security issues.50 
With the UNCFA’s success, the functional approach was internationally 
recognised as a practical approach towards peace. For example, ‘Functional 
Collaboration in World Affairs’ was the lead article in the December 1943 
edition of Nature. The article praised the success of the UNCFA as indicating 
that functional cooperation was effective in promoting cooperation among 
Great Powers in international peace and security.51 After the UNCFA, a series 
of conferences were held on international functional cooperation in such fields 
as labour, education, and economics, which the US State Department regarded 
as ‘barometer[s] for collaboration’ and also ‘rehearsal [s]’ for the conference for 
an international security organisation (UN). American policymakers considered 
that it was relatively easy to reach an agreement on functional problems such 
as those concerning food, relief, or health, and an agreement on these problems 
would pave the way for agreements on security issues, which then seemed to be 
more intractable.52
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When the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (San 
Francisco Conference), which was charged with examining the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals and drafting the UN Charter, opened on 25 April 1945, the 
participating delegates shared the above assumption with those at the UNCFA, 
which resulted in incorporating the promotion of international social welfare 
into the UN Charter.53 Also at the conference, owing to the Brazilian and 
Chinese delegates’ efforts,54 ‘health’ was included in the UN Charter as an 
international co-operation project that must be promoted, and it was decided 
that an international health conference should be convened within a few 
months.55 
While the need to convene an international health conference was determined 
at the San Francisco Conference, the procedure remained undecided. In 
September 1945, Biraud proposed the creation of a small committee comprising 
major Allies and the LNHO delegates for the preparation of an international 
health conference.56 On this occasion, Gautier urged both the USPHS and the 
British Ministry of Health, which were ‘the two leading health services’,57 
to reach a mutual agreement in order to facilitate the process.58 Up until this 
point, the collaboration between the LNHO experts and health officers of the 
major Allies had developed through the UNRRA’s health work as well as 
various meetings. In August 1944, during his stay in Washington, Gautier met 
with USPHS officials several times to discuss the establishment of the post-
war international health organisation.59 In October 1945, Gautier and Biraud 
sent a revised plan to the USPHS and the British Ministry of Health. Thomas 
Parran, who was the Surgeon General of the USPHS and who had read the 1943 
plan, asked Gautier in August 1944 to create a revised plan that would reflect 
the establishment of a new International Organisation (UN).60 This revised 
plan (1945 plan) was almost identical to their 1943 plan, in that it laid out the 
aforementioned four points, but this plan also included more details regarding 
the seat of an international health organisation and the relationship between the 
post-war international health organisation and the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC).61 
The chances of Biraud’s and Gautier’s ideas succeeding somewhat improved 
by the changes in the British government, while the United Kingdom (UK) 
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had opposed the 1943 plan which proposed to include health experts in the 
decision making-process within the new health organisation.62 Melville 
Mackenzie, Senior Medical Officer of the British Health Ministry, was in full 
agreement with most of the points Gautier and Biraud had made in the 1945 
plan, particularly with respect to the uniqueness of the international health 
organisation and regional decentralisation.63 The USPHS also agreed on the 
proposed uniqueness, the tripartite structure and the greater autonomy of the 
international health organisation, because the 1945 plan ‘falls perfectly in line 
with the prevailing thought here in the United States’.64 
In this way, the LNHO experts’ post-war plan approached the realisation 
by acquiring the backing of the US and UK. It was necessary for Gautier and 
Biraud to win over to their side the major Allies who took the initiative in 
establishing the post-war international order, including the international health 
organisation. The US and British officials also relied on the specialised advice 
rooted in the LNHO experts’ experience,65 and recognised the utility of health 
cooperation along with the experts’ plan in the post-war planning. This kind 
of collaboration between governmental officials and experts paved the way 
for a new form of global health in which both state and non-state actors could 
participate. 
US Initiative
Thereafter, the US accelerated its initiative in establishing a post-war 
international health organisation. In the late 1945, several meetings were held in 
Washington with officials from major Allies, through which general agreement 
on the functions and aim of the post-war international health organisation was 
reached.66 As Sealey clarified, during the interwar period, the US official was 
quite negative and even indifferent towards international sanitary cooperation,67 
which was quite in contrast to the US initiative around 1945. There were two 
possible reasons for the American initiative in establishing the international 
health organisation. One reason was purely technical; the US was afraid, based 
on the experience of the First World War, that various infectious diseases would 
become prevalent and affect the people and society of the US.68 The other 
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reason was political; the US highlighted the importance of economic, social, 
and humanitarian work as foundations for post-war global security.69 
The belief in the LNHO’s two features was shared not only by the ruling 
Democratic Party, but also by the opposition Republican Senators.70 In October 
1945, Joseph H. Ball, a young leading internationalist Republican along with 
several other senators submitted a report, in which Ball and his colleagues, 
through the use of statistics, pointed out that countries with a higher standard 
of living tended to buy more American goods and warned that the prevalence 
of infectious diseases in wider areas of the world would affect not only the US 
foreign market, but also the US domestic economy; they thus argued that the 
progress of international health would be essential for the economic prosperity 
of the US, and proposed that the international health organisation should engage 
not only in the prevention of epidemic diseases, but also in social medical 
programs.71 On 27 December 1945, the US Congress adopted the amendment of 
Joint Resolution 89, which reflected Ball’s report.72 The creation of the post-war 
international organisation was thus shaped by US non-partisan internationalism. 
Bargaining among Major Allies
In June 1945, however, there was not necessarily one shared opinion regarding 
the post-war international health organisation among major Allies. China and 
Brazil, the two leading countries which proposed to establish an international 
health organisation at the San Francisco Conference, along with the US and UK, 
agreed to establish an international health organisation with close ties to the UN 
as soon as possible.73 However, it was still unclear how to secure the agreement 
of France and the USSR on this point. The USSR consistently insisted that 
the power and authority of the international health organisation should be 
limited so that the organisation should not impede national sovereignty.74 At 
the UNCFA, which convened two years earlier, the representative from the 
USSR emphasised the importance of cooperation among Allies,75 and further 
cooperation after the War.76 The USSR’s positive attitude at that time was 
closely related to its wartime needs, since the USSR received a lot of support 
from the US under the Lend-Lease Act.77 However, with the death of Roosevelt 
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in April 1945, the inauguration of the more conservative President Harry 
Truman, and the advent of Cold War, the USSR largely changed its attitude 
towards international cooperation.78
The French attitude had also been a source of distress for the US and UK. 
In January 1946, the French Republic government proposed convening an 
international conference for International Sanitary Convention in May of that 
year, and sent the UK and US invitations. France intended, by this proposition, 
to conclude a new International Sanitary Convention before the birth of a new 
international health organisation, and to give the OIHP the supreme initiative 
in post-war international health work by supervising the new International 
Sanitary Convention. 
Because of this proposition, the US and France had several discussions and 
reached an agreement that the International Sanitary Convention should not 
be revised for the moment but would instead be temporarily supervised by 
the UNRRA, that the US would accept the French proposition only if the new 
international health organisation was not established before 1 October 1946, and 
that the new international health organisation should take over supervision of 
the International Sanitary Convention from the UNRRA if the new international 
health organisation was established by 1 October 1946.79 After this agreement, 
the US and UK moved forward on establishing the new international health 
organisation by 1 October 1946. 
A disagreement did, however, arise between the US and UK on whether the 
new health organisation should be established as a UN organ by the General 
Assembly’s resolution or as a UN specialised agency through a convention. 
The US insisted that the new international health organisation should be set up 
as a UN specialised agency so that the organisation should enjoy a high degree 
of autonomy and universality while keeping close ties with the UN.80 The US 
also pointed out the importance of specialised agencies’ financial autonomy 
by saying ‘a specialised agency could go ahead with the help of well-disposed 
countries, disregarding those less favourably inclined’.81 The US had in mind 
that an international agency with such autonomy could deal with various health 
topics without concerning itself with financial deficits. That was not the only 
intention, however. Such autonomy was convenient for the US because it would 
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allow the US as the richest country in the world to put the organisation under its 
control by making the largest monetary contribution.82 The UK, which was at 
first opposed to the US proposition, finally agreed to establish the organisation 
as a UN specialised agency.83 
A series of negotiations demonstrated that the major Allies attempted to build 
their national interests into the structure of the post-war health organisation, 
while sharing recognition of the need for establishing a unique international 
health organisation for the purpose of combatting diseases and promoting 
peace and security. The US won this power game: it succeeded in persuading 
major Allies. The UK, in particular, which assigned importance to walking 
in step with the US, was persuaded of the American point of view in spite of 
differences. This trend continued at the International Health Conference.
The Major Resolutions at the International Health Conference
The International Health Conference was held in New York in June 1946 for the 
purpose of drafting the WHO Constitution. At the conference, many essential 
points were discussed. Among them, this section focuses on six major decisions, 
which highlight how the WHO introduced a new form of world health body 
while retaining the old aspects. The first major decision was to establish a 
unique health organisation by absorbing the existing organisations, including 
the LNHO and the OIHP.84 Through this decision, a unified international health 
organisation without any duplication of work or rivalry was realised, which was 
essential in shifting international health from a loose network of experts and 
voluntary groups to a set of states responsible for the health and welfare of their 
populations.85 
The second major decision concerned the membership of the WHO. The 
US delegation strongly advocated that membership should be open to all states 
since it recognised that only a universal organisation could effectively control 
the international spread of diseases and promote health among all people 
through co-ordinated global action.86 Based on the US observation that all 
states, including ex-enemy countries, should be invited,87 the conference was 
attended by representatives of the fifty-one members of the United Nations, 
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observers from thirteen other states, including Austria and Italy, and the 
representatives of the allied control authorities in Germany, Japan and Korea.88 
The UK delegation, however, opposed the idea of universal membership by 
arguing that the eligibility of non-UN member countries should be carefully 
examined. After some negotiation, it was decided that member states of the 
UN and the states whose governments were invited to send observers to the 
conference may become members of the WHO by signing the constitution 
(Article 4, 5), and that non-UN member states may apply to become members 
by a simple majority vote of the World Health Assembly (Article 6).89
The title of the new health organisation also reflected this argument. The 
UK proposed ‘Health Organization of the United Nations’, which would 
prevent the association of non-UN member countries. The name ‘World Health 
Organization’ was then adopted for the purpose of including non-UN member 
countries.90 Universal membership, which means the inclusion of ex-enemy 
countries and non-UN member countries as well, was actually essential for 
practicing the functional approach. The overall emphasis on universality, which 
was strongly advocated by the US, recognised that only a universal organisation 
could effectively control the international spread of diseases and promote health 
among all people through co-ordinated global action.91
The third major decision concerned the membership of non-self-governing 
territories. The Chinese delegation proposed that the overseas territories should 
be admitted as ‘Associate Members’ who would have all the responsibilities and 
privileges of members, except the rights to vote or hold office. The delegations 
of the UK and France, two countries which back then still held many colonies 
and territories, displayed differing attitudes towards this proposition. Some 
of the British colonies had already been equipped with self-governing health 
systems.92 In this regard, the UK delegation insisted that such territories should 
only enjoy ‘Associate Membership’ without voting rights, while maintaining 
that non-self-governing territories should be represented in the regional 
offices with the same rights as member states. The French delegation, on the 
other hand, opposed the idea since it was all the more important to the French 
government that the health interests of such areas be represented by France 
directly.93
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A joint sub-committee was set up, including delegates from the US, UK, 
France and China, to examine the principles of ‘Associate Membership’, 
which prepared a formula regarding the ‘Associate Membership’. By this 
formula, the members proposed that non-self-governing territories could be 
admitted as ‘Associate Members’ to the World Health Assembly, based on an 
application made by the ‘parent state’, and that the rights and duties of ‘Associate 
Members’ should be determined by the World Health Assembly and the ‘parent 
state’ concerned. In summary, they attempted to authorise the ‘parent state’ to 
decide which territory should be admitted as an ‘Associate Member’ and also its 
rights and duties. When this formula was discussed at the conference, however, 
the second point was rejected,94 and the ‘parent state’ was only authorised to 
decide which territory should be admitted as an ‘Associate Member’.
The UK was not satisfied, however. The UK delegation urged that 
representatives of accepted ‘Associate Members’ should be chosen from among 
persons most qualified by their technical competence in the health field. This 
was not acceptable to the Liberian delegation who pointed out that on this 
basis, some representatives of ‘Associate Members’ would not be natives. 
Furthermore, the British Foreign Office instructed the UK delegation at the 
conference to substitute ‘inhabitants of the territory’ for ‘native population’.95 
A large majority at the conference supported the Liberian amendment and in 
the plenary session held on 17 July 1946, Article on ‘Associate Membership’ 
(Article 8) was accepted which provided that the representatives of ‘Associate 
Members’ should be ‘qualified by their technical competence in the field of 
health and should be chosen from the native population’.96
The fourth major decision concerned the supervision of international sanitary 
conventions. The World Health Assembly was authorised to adopt international 
sanitary conventions (Article 21), and it decided that those conventions would 
come into force for all member countries unless members notified the Director-
General of rejection or reservations within the due period (Article 22).97 The 
WHO thus had greater authority to supervise conventions than any other 
international health agency before the war. After a couple of revisions, the 
international sanitary conventions have been renamed ‘IHRs’. Under the IHRs, 
which was revised in 2005 and was entered into force in 2007, the WHO enjoys 
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further authorisation, including getting epidemic information from non-state 
actors, or surveillance over a wider range of global health threats.98
The fifth major decision concerned the regional arrangement under the 
WHO, which was controversial since British and American interests conflicted. 
In this discussion, the major dispute focused on whether to establish a loose 
federation of regional offices or a strong centralisation, while governments 
agreed that all the existing regional health organisations should ‘in due course’ 
be integrated in the new organisation.99 The US proclaimed the former as the 
defender of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB), a very autonomous 
regional health organisation, to secure its survival in the post-war period.100 The 
member countries of the Pan-Arab League also insisted on the former in order 
to secure the Regional Sanitary Information Bureau at Alexandria, which was 
created under the auspices of the Pan-Arab League. The UK, on the other hand, 
strongly insisted on centralisation. At that time, it was uncertain whether the 
British territories in the Caribbean or Middle East could properly participate in 
the regional sanitary system, while the UK assigned the highest importance to 
ensuring its territories’ full participation in the regional sanitary system.101
In this regard, the UK delegation proposed that the regional offices should be 
regarded as forming an integral part of the WHO and, as such, their staff should 
be appointed and paid by the WHO, which met the US opposition.102 After some 
negotiation, the UK delegation finally agreed that regional directors should be 
appointed by the Executive Board in agreement with the regional committees 
(Article 52), and that the staff of the regional offices should be appointed in a 
manner to be determined by agreement between the Director-General and the 
regional director (Article 53).103 The WHO’s regional system was thus designed 
as a result of negotiation among the major Allies, which largely depended on 
their political consideration. The WHO’s regional system has been criticised 
for its nepotism, and its inflexibility towards the changing global environment, 
while spending a big share of the overall budget and staff of the WHO.104 It 
is actually very hard to change this system, which has deep roots in regional 
interests. 
The sixth major decision concerned the WHO’s authority towards social-
medical activities. At the conference, almost all actors, including the LNHO 
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experts and major Allies, recognised the holistic approach towards human 
health and that the word ‘health’ should be interpreted in a broader sense, which 
reflected the strong social approach to health issues that the WHO inherited 
from the LNHO.105 As Amrith argues, the new definition of ‘health’ was to play 
a crucial role in the emergence of the notion that health was a responsibility of 
government and a right of citizenship.106
The concrete discussion on what kinds of activities the WHO should engage 
in was, however, quite controversial. There was some divergence between 
experts and some governmental representatives on this point. The former argued 
that medical aspects of social security must be a core part of international 
health, while the latter argued that the new health organisation must be confined 
to a narrow agenda, with few field officers or programmes, and thoroughly 
subordinated to national interests. The main opponent was, ironically, the US, 
which was once the main advocate for the social-medical approach. This was 
because, with the advent of the Cold War, the social-medical approach came to 
be closely associated with communism. As a compromise, it was decided that, 
in co-operation with other specialised agencies where necessary, the WHO was 
authorised to study and report on administrative and social techniques affecting 
public health and medical care from preventive and curative points of view, 
including hospital services and social security (Article 2-p).107 Because of this 
ambiguity, the kinds of activities and the extent to which the WHO should 
engage in these remain controversial.108
A few matters remained unsolved at the conference. One of them was 
the location of the WHO headquarters. This topic was quite controversial 
because it was closely related to the influence of the country, where the WHO 
headquarters was to be located, on the organisation. The possible candidates 
were New York, Paris and Geneva. The UK delegation strongly supported New 
York as a matter of principle on the grounds that a big international organisation 
such as the WHO should be located in the same place as the UN headquarters to 
secure the necessary contact between the heads of the administrations. The US 
also supported New York. While the US did not insist on New York as strongly 
as the UK, a headquarter located in New York was absolutely convenient 
for the US to keep the organisation under control and to negotiate the PASB 
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problem with the WHO. On the other hand, the Ukrainian SSR emphasised its 
discomfort with the arrangement in New York for fear of a strong US influence 
on the organisation and proposed an immediate decision in favour of Paris, 
which was supported by the Byelorussian SSR. France and Belgium insisted 
that the health organisation should have European headquarters.109 The dispute 
on this point finally resulted in the decision on Geneva in June 1948.
The Shadow of the Cold War
Among the various divergences at the conference, the most striking one was 
between the Russian group which attended the conference (USSR, Ukrainian 
SSR and Byelorussian SSR), and the West, with the advent of the Cold War. 
The Russian group was then well known for its negative attitude towards UN 
specialised agencies. For example, the USSR neither attended the constitutional 
conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) nor joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).110 
In accordance with such precedents, it was previously predicted that some 
divergence would arise between the Russian group and other Allies. In order 
to secure collaboration among the major Allies and to establish the WHO as 
soon as possible, the UK suggested voting the USSR into a Vice-Presidency 
at the conference, which resulted in Fedor Grigorievitch Krotkov, from the 
USSR, becoming Vice-Chairman of the conference with Parran as Chairman.111 
Despite this compromise, the differences between the USSR and the other 
Allies were striking, and various compromises had to be made. The USSR, 
which feared the excessive influence of the US on the new health organisation, 
attempted to limit the WHO’s authority as far as possible. In this regard, the 
Russian group suggested that the power and authority of the international 
health organisation should be limited so that the organisation should not impede 
national sovereignty.112 The Russian group also proposed that the constitution 
should only come into force upon ratification by twenty-six states, a majority 
of members of the UN, although the decision at the conference at that time had 
been that twenty-one ratifications should be required. The provision of twenty-
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six ratifications proposed by the USSR was accepted by the US and UK in order 
to prevent deadlock. Because of this process, it took about two years from the 
International Health Conference until the establishment of the WHO in April 
1948.
Furthermore, Russian group proposed an amendment to the effect that an 
absolute majority of members of each body should be required for a decision. 
In response to this proposition, the US and UK delegates pointed out that such 
an amendment would make the constitution unworkable in practice and that it 
was perhaps intended as a wrecking amendment.113 After a round of negotiation, 
it was determined that decisions of the World Health Assembly on important 
questions had to be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and 
voting, while decisions on other questions had to be made by a majority of the 
members present and voting (Article 60). Russian group also proposed that the 
Permanent Five should have permanent seats on the Executive Board, which 
the conference voted against.114 
The WHO Constitution was finally signed on 22 July 1946 by sixty states 
of which only China and the UK signed without reservation.115 Although the 
conference saw various divergences and compromises, some common ideas 
were shared, which reflected the LNHO’s two features and paved the way for 
the signature of the constitution. Even the USSR was relatively co-operative 
towards the WHO in comparison with other UN organs. In a final speech at 
the closing session of the conference, Krotkov strongly urged nations which 
had not ratified the constitution yet to do so as rapidly as possible. The USSR 
representative at the ECOSOC also stated that the Russian policy was to 
collaborate with the UN itself, but not with specialised agencies, except in 
the case of the WHO with which they proposed to collaborate to the fullest 
extent.116 The USSR finally ratified the constitution and became a WHO 
member on 24 March 1948, just before the organisation was established. The 
WHO was expected to become ‘the first UN specialised agency to which all 
members of the “Big three” would belong’, and this expectation was finally 
realised.117 On 7 April 1948, when the ratification of the twenty-six numbers 
was official, the WHO was founded and commenced its work.118 
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Conclusion 
The WHO creation process was, in part, quite similar to that of the LNHO, as 
a product of painstaking Anglo-American compromise. It was the UK which 
took the initiative in the creation of the LNHO. Without consulting other 
governments, ‘none of whom was showing any particular interest in the matter’, 
British officials had worked out a basic concept and agreed on it with their 
American colleague. They agreed to create an ‘active and progressive body’ 
under strict governmental control. The British involvement in the creation of 
the LNHO was motivated by the country’s theoretical interest in international 
health policy and by a perceived urgent need for practical co-operation to 
combat the typhus endemic in Eastern Europe.119 
Similarly, some major decisions at the International Health Conference were 
made as a result of politics among powers. The US in some part expected to 
secure its prosperity through the organisation, and tried to put the organisation 
under its strong influence by ensuring its financial autonomy and headquarters 
located in New York, to which the US could make the largest contribution. 
The UK and France, as great colonial powers, tried to establish a convenient 
system that would allow them to cater to their colonial interests. France also 
intended to defend the OIHP as taking a supreme initiative in international 
health. The USSR, which feared the excessive influence of the US on the 
new health organisation, attempted to limit the WHO’s authority as far as 
possible. Ultimately, the winner in this power game was the US. It succeeded in 
persuading the major Allies, while making various concessions to the USSR in 
order to prevent a deadlock. The UK, in particular, which attached importance 
to keeping in step with the US regarding wartime needs and the Cold War 
strategy, was persuaded of the American point of view despite their differences.
On the other hand, two new stories accompanied this old repeated story: the 
first was that the major Allies’ earnest engagement in the creation of the WHO 
was motivated not only by their national interests, but also by their strong 
expectation for the role this new health organisation would play in the global 
security system. In particular, the US believed that making international health 
work one of the UN’s main functions would lead to ‘freedom from want’, 
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international stability, and prosperity of the US as well, prompting the US 
initiative following the San Francisco Conference. 
The second new aspect was that representatives from non-Western countries 
showed strong resistance towards the big powers’ arbitrary movements and 
succeeded in establishing a new system in which they could represent by 
themselves. At the Paris Conference held in 1919 to establish the League of 
Nations, the major powers reached major decisions in a closed process that 
often excluded non-Western countries or regions.120 Only representatives from 
Liberia, India, and China attended the International Health Conference on 
their countries’ behalf, since a large part of the non-Western region was still 
not independent. Their role, however, was essential in creating the foundation 
for universal membership to the organisation. Because of the articles on the 
membership of non-self-governing territories, several countries, including 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Ethiopia, became affiliated with the organisation 
just a few years after the International Health Conference, and several others, 
including Sudan, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, were admitted as Associate 
Members, and later became official members of the WHO. Affiliation to the 
WHO was important for those countries not only in technical terms, but also 
in diplomatic terms. For example, Japan joined the WHO in May 1951 as an 
official member before its independence in September of that year, paving 
the way for its affiliation to the UN in 1956. The universal membership by 
which non-self-governing territories could represent themselves also served as 
the basis for the emergence of the new concept of global health according to 
which health was a responsibility of government and citizens enjoyed a right to 
health.121 
The League’s experts—Loveday, Bruce, and McDougall in convening 
the UNCFA, and the LNHO experts in preserving the LNHO’s features—
also played an essential role, which was the third new aspect. The presence 
of the LNHO experts was not prominent in international political events 
such as San Francisco Conference. Behind the scenes, however, the LNHO 
experts drafted post-war plans, divided the process into smaller stages for 
implementation, identified the most effective actors to win over to their side, 
and implemented their plans. Gautier and Biraud remained in close contact 
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with other LNHO experts while trying to acquire the support of the US and 
UK. For example, Gautier wrote to Thorvald Madsen, the former Chairman of 
the LNHO Permanent Committee on Biological Standardisation, in November 
1945, informing him of the responses of the USPHS and the British Ministry of 
Health to their post-war plan and asking for any useful information: 
Both in Washington and London, I tried to press through my ideas which 
I consider essential for the smooth running of any future world health 
organisation. The principle of unity which I defended seems to have been 
accepted in Washington.122 
Their approach was skillful that could only be taken by experts who were 
familiar with both on-the-spot international health work and international 
politics that allowed them to create early drafts of post-war plans, identify 
the most effective actors to win over to their side, and ask each part for co-
operation. Their hopes for a single, united, and centralised institution with 
universal membership were finally realised. Similarly, the organisational 
structure, though vastly more elaborate, was based on the plan Biraud had 
drafted in 1943.123 
The experts’ role and their international network were also crucial in 
defending the WHO’s work from political tension in its early days. At 
the International Health Conference, the WHO Interim Commission was 
established as the interim working body until the WHO Constitution came into 
force, where many of the former LNHO experts assumed key roles.124 Biraud 
was made the Deputy Director-General and Gautier was made a Counsellor for 
the Executive Secretary, while Rajchman did not get involved in the WHO.125 
They developed fieldwork services, including staff education program and BCG 
vaccine program, in Asia and Africa,126 which became the base for the future 
Technical Assistant Program of the UN. They also developed collaboration with 
other specialised agencies such as the FAO and United Nations International 
Children's Emergency Fund (later United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF), 
through their personnel network. For example, McDougall from the FAO and 
Biraud kept in close touch around 1946.127 And Director-Generals of the WHO, 
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as Staples clarifies, demonstrated their commitment to professional competence 
rather than national or political ideology amid the political tension of the Cold 
War.128 This illustrates the emergence of a new transnational network that 
included non-Western and non-state actors, and which later became the basis 
for the GHG; however, traditional power politics persisted.
The WHO was thus established, mixing hope for a better world with the 
reality of power politics. How do we evaluate these opposing aspects? It is likely 
that most international health organisations have been historically equipped 
with both old and new aspects, and the evaluation of each organisation depends 
on how it overcame the former and how it developed the latter. The same is 
true for the WHO since ‘the reality of power politics’ has been embedded in 
the structure of the WHO, which sustained its weak points. Some of the main 
criticisms towards the WHO, including the inefficiency of the regional system 
and the financial deficit, were the product of diplomatic bargaining among 
major Allies and also the product of old power politics, which dates back to the 
pre-war period. Even the new aspects did not necessarily function smoothly 
under the WHO: the social medical activities were dying down with the advent 
of the Cold War; the confrontation between the US and USSR continued in 
spite of the WHO’s various eradication programs involving the two countries, 
which indicated that it was too naive to assume that just throwing the stone of 
functional work would lead to the development of international cooperation;129 
the experts’ greater authority turned into the organisation’s bureaucratism 130 
with the demise of passionate experts who believed in the League’s features, 
and with the growing size of the organisation.
It will not be easy to overcome these aspects, which have historically deep 
roots, and to develop new aspects in the right direction. However, new aspects, 
including the transnational network or the WHO’s authority in IHRs, could play 
a crucial role in such efforts. It should also be noted that member countries, 
which gave birth to the organisation after negotiation and compromise, could 
play an essential role in the rebirth of the organisation through technical, 
personnel, and financial contributions. If they could devote as much political 
will to the rebirth of the organisation as they did to its birth, the way ahead 
would be smoother. The long-term efforts would pave the way for the rebirth of 
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the WHO as the basis for lasting peace, and the realisation of a better healthy 
world, as shared at the International Health Conference in 1946.  
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